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THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: EMANATIONS 
AND INTIMATIONS 
Robert B. McKay* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background: The Legacy of Brandeis 
W HEN Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren wrote in 1890 of "The Right to Privacy,"1 they sought a means of protecting 
against unwelcome newspaper attention to social activities in the 
Warren household.2 Addressing their argument to the private law of 
torts, they presumably did not anticipate constitutional protection 
for other rights under the claim of privacy. Nevertheless, seventy· 
five years later that concept, now called the "right of privacy," was 
used by the Supreme Court of the United States in Griswold v. 
Connecticut8 to describe a constitutional right. Some members of the 
Court said the new right was within the "penumbra" formed by 
"emanations" from specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights, while 
others emphasized that it was an always present, but previously 
undiscovered, "right of the people" preserved in the almost for-
gotten ninth amendment.4 
It is ironic that the seventy-five-year-old right of privacy (against 
tori:), although introduced under distinguished sponsorship and 
widely acclaimed as a forward step in the development of the law, 
has not yet been clearly defined or even generally acknowledged. 
William Prosser has described the right of privacy as a protection 
against "not one tort, but a complex of four."5 There has been some 
dissent from that view-,6 and there is no general consensus as to the 
exact boundaries of the tort. The right of privacy against tort ( or 
against four torts) moved with hesitant steps toward general recog-
nition; in contrast, the constitutional right of privacy, arising out of 
rather different considerations, apparently became at once fully 
mature upon first articulation by the Supreme Court in Griswold. 
• Associate Dean and Professor of Law, New York University.-Ed. 
I. Warren &: Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). 
2. See MAsoN, BRANDEIS-A FREE MAN'S LIFE 70 (1946). 
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
4. Even the literature on the ninth amendment is not extensive. See PATI'ERSON, 
THE FoRGOTI'EN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Fed-
eral Constitution, 11 !ND. L.J. 309 (1936); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights • • . 
Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 
47 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 787 (1959). 
5. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960). 
6. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity-An Answer to Dean Prosser, 
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964). 
[259] 
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A further irony is the fact that the device that launched the consti-
tutional right of privacy was the humble contraceptive, whose very 
existence was little recognized in the polite society whose privacy 
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect, but which by 1965 had 
become the subject of public hearings in Congress and in many 
state capitols, as well as the subject of a feature story with full-color 
illustrations in a widely circulated magazine. 7 
One wonders what Mr. Brandeis, as he was in 1890, or Mr. 
Justice Brandeis, as he was from 1916 to 1939, would have thought 
of these developments. Whatever may have been his original view 
of the matter, certainly Brandeis came ultimately to regard the 
right of privacy as a concept with more than one facet; one may 
speculate that he may have recognized that it was capable of still 
further growth. In 1928, long after the 1890 article, Brandeis wrote 
his celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States,8 in which he 
objected strongly to the majority ruling that messages passed along 
telephone wires are not within the fourth amendment's protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although he surely did 
not then have in mind the specific problem which would be raised 
in 1965 in the Griswold case, his words had a prophetic quality. 
Reminding the Court that clauses in the Constitution have been 
broadly interpreted to cover activities and objects "of which the 
Fathers could not have dreamed," he warned: 
Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific 
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a 
changing world. . . . The progress of science in furnishing the 
Government with means of espionage is not likely to stop with 
wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the 
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, 
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to 
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home .... 
Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such 
invasions of individual security?9 
Brandeis described "the right to be let alone," the expressive 
phrase first used by Judge Cooley,1° as "the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men."11 In emphasizing 
the urgent necessity of protecting against "every unjustifiable intru-
7. Life, Sept. 10, 1965, p. 59. 
8. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
9. Id. at 472, 474. 
10. CooLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888). See also Griswold, The Right To Be Let Alone, 
55 Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1960). 
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). 
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sion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual,"12 Mr. 
Justice Brandeis borrowed extensively from what Mr. Brandeis had 
written thirty-eight years earlier.18 
B. Griswold v. Connecticut: An Anticlimax and a New 
Point of Departure 
Despite much off-Court criticism of the majority ruling in 
Olmstead and some expressions of dissatisfaction within the Court, 
it remains true in 1965, as in 1928, that the only restrictions on wire-
tapping depend on statute, not on constitutional inhibition. How-
ever, the creation of the new right of marital privacy in the home 
by-passed altogether the constitutional difficulties of the Olmstead 
rationale. Instead, the new right was compounded in some undefined 
way of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 
The decision in Griswold v. Connecticut answered one question, 
but perhaps only one. The Court held that the Connecticut statute 
forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutionally invaded the 
right of marital privacy. By 1965 the ruling on that narrow question 
was almost anticlimatic. Twice before, in 194314 and 1961,15 the 
same issue had been presented to the Court, but both cases had been 
dismissed for lack of standing or ripeness. When the Court finally 
decided the substantive issue, few remained to defend the statute. 
The Roman Catholic Church, for instance, which presumably had 
supported the retention of the Connecticut ban on the use of contra-
ceptives, seemed reconciled to the invalidation of the statute in 
Griswold.16 
To conclude that there was general satisfaction with the result in 
Griswold is not, however, to suggest that there was general agree-
ment as to the soundness of the constitutional grounds on which the 
decision was based. Nor should it be thought that those who ap-
plauded the result were in accord as to the future significance of the 
holding. In order to understand why the case raised more questions 
than it answered, it is necessary first to summarize briefly the various 
opinions in the case. It will then be possible to sort out some of the 
possible future "emanations" from a decision that was itself said to 
be grounded on "emanations" from the Bill of Rights. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Edward J. Bloustein noted the nearly verbatim identity of several passages in 
the 1890 article and the 1928 dissent and concluded that "the underlying conceptual 
scheme is identical." Bloustein, supra note 6, at 976. 
14. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
15. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
16. See text accompanying notes 102-11 infra. 
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C. The Griswold Opinions 
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing the opinion of the Court, con-
cluded that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance."17 Itemizing, he found that "the First Amendment has 
a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intru-
sion."18 He also found facets of privacy in the third amendment's 
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time 
of peace without the consent of the owner; in the fourth amend-
ment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures; in the 
fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination; and in the 
ninth amendment's reservation of additional, unspecified rights 
"retained by the people."19 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for himself, Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren, and Mr. Justice Brennan, joined in Mr. Justice Douglas' 
opinion and conclusion that "Connecticut's birth-control law uncon-
stitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy .... "20 His 
concurring opinion was written "to emphasize the relevance of [the 
ninth amendment] ... to the Court's holding."21 
The ninth amendment, which had almost no judicial interpreta-
tion between 1791 and 1965, is at best cryptic: "The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." In those words Mr. Justice 
Goldberg found the constitutional haven he sought for the cherished 
right to be let alone, at least for the limited purpose of protecting the 
"private realm of family life."22 Although he recognized that the 
Constitution does not expressly mention the right of marital privacy, 
he nonetheless could not "believe that it offers these fundamental 
rights no protection .... Rather, as the Ninth Amendment expressly 
recognizes, there are fundamental personal rights such as this one, 
which are protected from abridgment by the Government though 
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution."23 Finally, he con-
tended that where, as in Griswold, "fundamental personal liberties 
are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a 
17. 381 U.S. at 484. 
18. Id. at 483. 
19. Id. at 484. 
20. Id. at 486. 
21. Id. at 487. 
22. Id. at 495, quoting from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944), Sec 
also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925). 
23. 381 U.S. at 495-96. 
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showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to 
the effectuation of a proper state purpose."24 
Justices Harlan and White concurred in the result, but argued 
that the statute should be held invalid as a violation of the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, apart from any meaning 
derived from the Bill of Rights.25 Their views are more fully dis-
cussed in part II below. 
In dissent, Mr. Justice Black Gained by Mr. Justice Stewart) 
objected principally to the Goldberg opinion. Finding no protection 
for the right of privacy .in any provision of the Constitution, Mr.· 
Justice Black bluntly expressed his fear that the Court was claiming 
for the federal judiciary the "power to invalidate any legislative act 
which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or offensive."26 
The issues on which the Court divided in Griswold raise vital 
questions as to the nature of the federal judicial power, and the 
disagreements are basic. It is therefore important to sift the issues 
and determine, to the extent possible, whether the constitutional 
frame on which the new right of privacy was erected invites further 
expansion into other areas, or whether the platform was a temporary 
edifice built for this case alone. · 
Of the many fascinating perspectives from which the several 
opinions in Griswold could be viewed, inquiry will here be limited 
to three propositions. (1) Does the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment impose any substantive limitations upon state 
power beyond what can reasonably be found in the "specific" pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights? (2) What is the relationship, if any, 
between the right of marital privacy and other aspects of the right 
of privacy, such as the fourth and fifth amendments' prohibitions 
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against compelled 
self-incrimination? (3) What, if anything, does Griswold foretell of 
the permissible role of government in the study of popula~on con-
trol and, more specifically, in the dissemination of birth control 
information? 
II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND 
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
There is no specific textual link between any provision of the 
fourteenth amendment and the protections accorded certain per-
sonal liberties in other parts of the Constitution, particularly in the 
24. Id. at 497. 
25. Id. at 499, 502. 
26. Id. at 511. 
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Bill of Rights. It has long been accepted constitutional doctrine, 
however, that at least "some of the personal rights safeguarded 
by the first eight Amendments against National action may also be 
safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would 
be a denial of due process of law."27 Nevertheless, three vital issues 
centering on the due process clause have caused recurring conflict 
on the Court. 
In the first place, there has been disagreement as to which rights 
should be deemed applicable to the states through the' due process 
clause. The catalogue of rights thus carried over has expanded rap-
idly in recent years; by 1965 the Court had ruled applicable to the 
states all the provisions of the first and fourth amendments, as well as 
the most significant aspects of the fifth, sixth, and eighth amend-
ments.28 
A second division of opinion within the Court has involved the 
question whether those specifics of the Bill of Rights that are re-
garded as carried over into the due process clause should limit the 
. states to the same extent that they limit the national government. 
That question has now been resolved in the affirmative,20 although 
by no means unanimously.so 
The third major issue in this area-the issue to which Griswold 
adds new dimension-is the question whether the due process clause 
not only draws within its prohibitions the fundamental specific pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights but also, by "emanation" or otherwise, 
limits state governments in additional, largely unspecified ways. 
This question was raised in 1947 in Adamson v. California.st In that 
case the basic issue was whether the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment protects an accused against a state-imposed re-
quirement of testimonial compulsion to the same extent as the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination protects an accused 
against the federal government. A majority of the Court answered 
in the negative, holding in effect that the privilege against self-
incrimination was not carried over into the due process clause 
of the fourteenth amendment-a holding subsequently overruled 
27. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). 
28. The matter is well reviewed in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in 
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965): 
Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV, L. REv. 746 (1965); Henkin, 
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963). 
29. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963). 
30. Id. at 45 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
31. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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in 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan.32 The dispute as to the possible in-
clusion of non-Bill of Rights protections within the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment took place among the Adamson· 
dissenters. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, con-
tended that the due process clause should be read to make the Bill 
of Rights fully applicable to the states. He rejected not only the 
doctrine of "selective incorporation," but also the more expansive 
reading of due process urged by Justices Rutledge and Murphy, 
also in dissent.83 While those Justices agreed with the Black-Douglas 
view "that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be 
carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,"34 they were "not prepared to say that the latter is entirely 
and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights."35 
The potential for constitutional conflict inherent in the Murphy-
Rutledge view of due process became evident in 1952 when, in 
Rochin v. California,36 all eight members of the Court who partici-
pated in the decision agreed that the due process clause forbade the 
use in evidence of capsules secured from the accused by means of 
forcible "stomach pumping." There was, however, a significant dis-
agreement over the operative rationale. The majority, through Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter, thought that this was 
conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the 
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and re-
move what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's 
contents-this course of proceeding by agents of government to 
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. 
They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit 
of constitutional differentiation.37 
By this time Justices Murphy and Rutledge were gone, so we 
cannot know how they would have reacted to this seeming acceptance 
of their Adamson position. But Justices Black and Douglas were 
quick to point out their fears of unconfined judicial discretion in 
interpretation of the due process clause. Although Mr. Justice Frank-
furter asserted that "the vague contours of the Due Process Clause 
do not leave judges at large,"38 Mr. Justice Black urged again his 
Adamson view that a specific constitutional text must be found for 
32. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
33. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 124. 
35. Ibid. (Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., dissenting). 
36. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
37. Id. at 172. 
38. Id. at 170. 
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every constitutional prohibition. For Mr. Justice Black, the fifth 
amendment privilege against self-incrimination supplied such a text 
in cases where, as in Rochin, "incriminating evidence is forcibly 
taken from [ an accused] by a contrivance of modem science."80 But, 
he said, there is "no express constitutional language granting judicial 
power to invalidate every state law of every kind deemed 'unreason-
able' or contrary to the Court's notion of civilized decencies .... "40 
Inevitably, later cases revealed disagreements that could not be 
papered over with agreement as to result,41 and the Black-Douglas 
view was strongly reiterated in dissent. 
Griswold, however, presented the new phenomenon of the so-
called libertarian result being upheld over the dissent of Mr. Justice 
Black, who is often regarded as the leader of the libertarian forces 
on the Court. He could find no reasonably express provision in the 
Constitution guaranteeing the right of marital privacy, and he could 
not agree with Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestion that such a right 
could be discovered in the emanations from other provisions. He 
rejected the due process argument of Justices Harlan and White 
and the ninth amendment rationale of Mr. Justice Goldberg "be-
cause on analysis they tum out to be the same thing-merely using 
different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary 
power to invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irra-
tional, unreasonable or offensive."42 
Although Mr. Justice Black's disagreement with the reasons 
given by some of the Justices was not unexpected, surely the matter 
calls for further analysis when it is noted that the sole ally for the 
Black position was Mr. Justice Stewart, while those most frequently 
found in agreement with Black were ranged on the other side in 
varying degrees of disagreement. 
Mr. Justice Douglas, it will be remembered, had originally 
shared Mr. Justice Black's view that due process permits full incorpo-
ration of the specifics of the Bill of Rights, but does not permit pro-
tections beyond those relatively confined limits. Although Mr. Justice 
Douglas emphasized in his opinion for the Court in Griswold the 
penumbras and emanations from various amendments, he was no-
39. Id. at 175. 
40. Id. at 176. Mr. Justice Douglas agreed in a separate concurring opinion, id, at 
179. 
41. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood sample taken from 
person rendered unconscious by automobile accident admissible at trial); Irvine v. 
California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (evidence secured by police through repeated illegal 
entries into a home admissible at trial). 
42. 381 U.S. at 511. 
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where specific about the exact source of the right of marital privacy. 
For all of Mr. Justice Black's forgiving reference to a "narrow" dis-. 
agreement with Mr. Justice Douglas, "relating to the application of 
the First Amendment to the facts and circumstances of this particular 
case,''43 it is difficult to find in the Douglas opinion a basis for even 
the minimal predictability requisite for constitutional stability. Ef-
forts to define due process in terms of "emanations" seem scarcely 
more likely to succeed than the somewhat circular efforts to define 
due process without any external standard more definite than "con-
siderations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions 
of the legal profession."44 
All members of the present Court agree, as presumably all 
Justices who have sat in the past have agreed, that the Supreme 
Court has no authority to review the wisdom of legislation enacted 
by Congress or state legislative bodies. To do so would be to infringe 
upon the legislative domain. Framing the issue in such terms, how-
ever, scarcely advances rational resolution of the very real issues that 
divide the Court. There are three, or perhaps four, views of this 
matter taken by various members of the Court. Understandably, each 
. group asserts that its way of looking at the matter provides textually 
supportable answers, whereas other approaches produce rulings based 
only upon the personal predilections of the judges. The issues thus 
raised are at the very center of any inquiry into the nature of the 
judicial process; accordingly, a clear understanding of the implica-
tions of the various positions is critically important. 
In 1961, in the widely criticized45 decision in Poe v. Ullman,46 
the Supreme Court refused to hear an earlier challenge to the Con-
necticut anti-contraceptive law, for the stated reason that the case was 
not ripe for adjudication on the merits. Mr. Justice Harlan made 
clear in his dissent in Poe that he would vote for invalidation of 
the statute if there should ever be an opportunity to pass on the 
merits. In discussing the "liberty" protected by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment, he said: 
This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in 
terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and 
religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from un-
reasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational con-
43. Ibid. 
44. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952). 
45. See, e.g., 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 106 (1962). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
524-39 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). · 
46. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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tinuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all 
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints .... 47 
However much other members of the Court objected to the 
Connecticut law, it seemed likely that the constitutional rationale 
advanced by Mr. Justice Harlan would not be persuasive to a ma-
jority of the Court.48 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented separately in 
Poe, suggesting a quite different view of due process from that out-
lined in the Harlan opinion. Perhaps forecasting his later opinion 
in Griswold, Mr. Justice Douglas described "liberty" as "a conception 
that sometimes gains content from the emanations of other specific 
guarantees ... or from experience with the requirements of a free 
society.''49 Mr. Justice Black dissented from the refusal to reach and 
decide the merits in Poe, but did not join the Douglas dissent. In-
deed, in view of Mr. Justice Black's repeated insistence that the due 
process clause must not be read to limit the states except in ways 
reasonably inferable from the specifics of the Bill of Rights, it would 
have been surprising had he joined in the somewhat unguarded talk 
of emanations in the Douglas opinion. 
After 1961 it seemed entirely possible that a review of the Con-
necticut law on the merits might find a majority of the Court, under 
the leadership of Mr. Justice Black, unwilling to overturn the statute. 
With that possibility in mind, opponents of the Connecticut law 
re-examined the constitutional guarantees to determine whether 
other arguments could be advanced to persuade the Court to in-
validate the Connecticut law. The most plausible rationale was 
advanced by my colleague Norman Redlich, who reminded the op-
ponents of the statute that the ninth amendment offers shelter to 
certain rights "retained by the people" and that certain rights are 
"reserved ... to the people" by the tenth amendment.50 Anticipating 
the charge that these provisions would provide a textual standard no 
more definite than due process, he argued: 
When the question of standards is posed within the context 
47. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
48. No one joined in the Harlan dissent in Poe, although Mr. Justice Stewart, who 
agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan on ripeness, said that "in refraining from a discussion 
of the constitutional issues, I in no way imply that the ultimate result I would reach 
·on the merits of these controversies would differ from the conclusions of my dissent• 
ing Brothers Uustices Douglas and Harlan]." Id. at 555. Whatever indication of sym-
pathy for the Harlan position there was in that statement vanished when Mr. Justice 
Stewart dissented in Griswold, specifically repudiating the views of both Justices Doug-
las and Harlan. 
49. Id. at 517. 
50. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ••• Retained by the People"!, 87 N.Y.U.L. 
REV. 787 (1962). 
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of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, rather than in terms of 
due process, a definite pattern starts to emerge. To comply with 
the purposes of these Amendments, the textual standard should 
be the entire Constitution. The original Constitution and its 
amendments project through the ages the image of a free and 
open society. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments recognized-
at the very outset of our national experience-that it was im-
possible to fill in every detail of this image. For that reason cer-
tain rights were reserved to the people. The language and his-
tory of the two Amendments indicate that the rights reserved 
were to be of a natm;e comparable to the rights enumerated. 
They were "retained ... by the people" not because they were 
different from the rights specifically mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, but because words were considered inadequate to define 
all of the rights which man should possess in a free· society and 
because it was believed that the enumeration might imply that 
other rights did not exist.51 
On the basis of that reasoning, Professor Redlich was able to 
argue that the suggested application of these amendments would not. 
resurrect the discredited freedom-of-contract theory of cases like 
Lochner v. New York,52 which he thought 
hardly fits into the scheme of rights set forth in our Constitution. 
But the right of a married couple to maintain the intimacy of 
their marital relationship free from the criminal sanction of the 
state does fit into the pattern of a society which set forth in its 
national charter that men should be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures. 53 
Professor Redlich's suggestion, which invited a detour around 
sharply divergent views as to the meaning of the due process clause, 
was adopted by three members of the Griswold Court, in Mr. Justice 
Goldberg's opinion. 
[T]he Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's 
authors that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly 
enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent that 
the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive. . . . 
The Ninth Amendment simply shows the intent of the Consti-
tution's authors that other fundamental personal rights should 
not be denied such protection or disparaged in any other way 
simply because they are not specifically listed in the first eight 
constitutional amendments.54 
51. Id. at 810-11. 
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
53. Redlich, supra note 50, at 811. 
54. 381 U.S. at 492. Mr. Justice Douglas also referred to the ninth amendment, but 
without explanation of its relevance. Id, at 484. 
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There seemed then little more to be done except to establish in some 
reasonably objective manner that the right to marital privacy was one 
of the retained "fundamental personal rights." But Mr. Justice Gold-
berg, in his anxiety to demonstrate that "judges are not left at large 
to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions, ,,66 raised 
new doubts as to the objectivity of that standard when he cited two 
cases based on the notion of flexible due process. Quoting from Sny-
der v. Massachusetts,66 he said that judges "must look to the 'tradi-
tions and [collective] conscience of our people' to determine whether 
a principle is 'so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.' "57 He relied on Powell v. Alabama58 £or the proposition that 
"the inquiry is whether a right involved 'is of such a character that it 
cannot be denied without violating those "fundamental principles of 
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institutions .... " '"59 
When Mr. Justice Goldberg thus failed to differentiate between 
the ninth amendment "retained" rights and the flexible due process 
concept, it was to be expected that Mr. Justice Black would repudi-
ate the new constitutional canon for the same reasons for which he 
had always rejected the old. There is indeed much merit in Mr. 
Justice Black's complaint that the Harlan due process argument and 
the Goldberg ninth amendment argument "tum out to be the same 
thing .... "60 
If there is any one proposition on which all members of the Court 
seem agreed, it is that there must be no return to the philosophy 
that allowed judicial invalidation on due process grounds of legisla-
tion intended to promote economic or social welfare. The Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that it is not concerned "with the wisdom, 
need or appropriateness" of legislation.61 In 1963 Mr. Justice Black 
wrote a kind of epitaph for that constitutional period in Ferguson v. 
Skrupa: "The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, 
Burns, and like cases-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws 
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely 
-has long since been discarded."62 Justices Black and Stewart saw 
in Griswold a revival of that discarded doctrine. Unfortunately, the 
55. Id. at 493. 
56. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
57. 381 U.S. at 493. 
58. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
59. 381 U.S. at 493. 
60. Id. at 511. 
61. Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference &: Bond Ass'n, 818 U.S. 236, 246 
(1941). 
62. 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
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Douglas and Goldberg opinions are not altogether reassuring that 
the solutions they proposed are secure against expansion into another 
period of judicial revisionism. 
It is tempting, when the Bill of Rights is not inclusive enough to 
protect against real or imagined governmental excesses, to search 
elsewhere for restraints that many believe should be found in a basic 
charter. Further cases may provide refinement of the ninth amend-
ment view of the retained rights of the people so as to give the 
requisite certainty and protect against unconfined judi,ial inventive-
ness. In ·this quest for certainty, the tests suggested by Professor Red-
lich deserve further attention. In areas of general economic and social 
policy he would have the courts defer to legislative judgment so long 
as it appears reasonably related to a valid legislative end. But when 
the legislature extends its action to regulate a right that may be re-
garded as "an essential ingredient of the free society established by 
our Constitution,"63 it is not improper to "require overwhelming 
proof of necessity and the absence of other and less burdensome 
means to achieve [the legislative] ... objectives."64 He argues that 
although here-as elsewhere-no purely objective criteria can be 
established, judges would not be at large; "the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments should be used to define rights adjacent to, or analo-
gous to, the pattern of rights which we find in the Constitution."65 
Whether satisfactorily objective standards can be substituted for 
the purely personal reactions of judges still remains for future dem-
onstration. Depending upon where the philosophy of Griswold leads, 
either the case will gain a respected place in constitutional juris-
prudence as the progenitor of a new source of protection for "funda-
mental personal rights," or it will be cast aside as a judicial experi-
ment that proved unworkable. The answer may depend in part on 
the future development of the right of privacy itself, the matter with 
which part III of this article is concerned. 
Ill. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AND FIFTH AMENDMENTS 
Even before 1965 the right. of privacy was a variable concept, de-
scribing a variety of interests used by judges "in different senses and 
for varying purposes."66 The use of the term implies a value judg-
63. Redlich, supra note 50, at 812. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, [1962) 
SUP. CT. REv. 212. For a reflective discussion of the contemporary potential of the 
privacy concept, see Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and Behavioral Research, 65 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1184 (1965). 
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ment that any invasion of that "right" is somehow ·wrong and should 
be resisted. The difficulty is that the notion of a right of privacy has 
been invoked as often as ,the proverbial cry of "wolf." Its meaning, 
if it was ever clear, has become diluted and uncertain through over-
generous application to a wide variety of situations. To determine 
the likely generative impact of the right of privacy as applied in 
Griswold, it is necessary to know more of the origins, development, 
and current significance of the term. 
A The Right of Privacy in Constitutional History 
In the United States the principal development of the constitu-
tionally protected right of privacy has been in connection with limi-
tations imposed on the authority of government to seize persons or 
property. It is familiar history that before the American Revolution 
the practice had been prevalent in the colonies of issuing to revenue 
officers "writs of assistance" that empowered them in their discretion 
to search suspicious places for smuggled goods.07 In 1761 James Otis 
denounced the writs because they placed "the liberty of every man 
in the hands of every petty officer."68 Of the debate in which that 
remark was made, John Adams was lat.er to declare that "then and 
there the child Independence was born."69 
By 1765 the famous ruling in Entick v. Carrington70 had fixed the 
course of English law against the search of homes for incriminating 
evidence pursuant to a general writ or other discretionary exercise 
of official authority. Thus was constitutional protection given to a 
right of privacy against seizure of person or property, but ordinarily 
in terms of property concepts, such as protection against trespass. 
This great right, translated into the fourth amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States as a protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures, has been zealously defended; but when 
this privacy right has been successfully invoked, it has usually been 
in the context of protection against the unreasonable search and 
seizure of persons or tangible property. Even in Boyd v. United 
States,11 when the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment's 
privilege against self-incrimination were sal<l to "run almost into each 
67. The relevant history is recapitulated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
624-31 (1886). See ·also l,ASSON, HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, 
and the Fourth Amendment, (1960] SUP. CT. REv. 46. 
68. Quoted in Boyd v. United States, supra note 67, at 625. 
69. Ibid. 
70. 19 Howell's State Trials 1029. 
71. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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other,"72 the factual situation involved a statutory authorization to 
compel the production of private papers or to have their presumed 
contents taken as confessed against the person withholding them. 
Similarly, when the exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment 
was applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio,73 the problem again in-
volved a seizure of tangible property. 
These cases are linked to Griswold only by use of the term "right 
of privacy" to apply to both types of rights. If, then, the right of 
marital privacy is to be regarded as an emanation from the Bill of 
Rights, or if it is a right retained by the people pursuant to the 
ninth amendment, the question that naturally arises is whether there 
are other "rights of privacy," hitherto unprotected-perhaps not yet 
even discovered-that might now come ,v:ithin this more com-
modious constitutional shelter. 
Candidates for constitutional protection as part of the right of 
privacy are not wanting. The privacy claim had earlier been un-
successfully invoked in a number of cases. Those situations should 
now be re-examined to see if they meet the new standard. Perhaps, 
too, this inquiry may throw some light on the question whether the 
newly discovered right of marital privacy has a generative potential 
for other, heretofore untested, situations. 
B. Privacy, Wiretapping, and Eavesdropping 
The most celebrated instance in which the Supreme Court has 
applied the protection-of-property rationale of the fourth amendment 
to deny expansion of the amendment's protection into other areas 
of privacy is Olmstead v. United States.74 In holding that the fourth 
amendment does not prohibit the use of evidence secured by wire-
tapping, Mr. Chief Justice Taft emphasized the "property" aspects 
of the amendment's protective reach: 
The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of 
material things-the person, the house, his papers or his effects. 
The description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding 
lawful, is that it must specify the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized .... The language of the Amend-
ment can not be extended and expanded to include telephone 
wires reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house 
or office. 75 
72. Id. at 630. . 
73. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silver-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
75. Id. at 464-65. 
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The dissents of Justices Brandeis and Holmes, although neither 
then nor since persuasive to a majority of the Court on this specific 
issue, have much in common with the Douglas and Goldberg opin-
ions in Griswold. In his brief dissent, Mr. Justice Holmes acknowl-
edged the possibility "that the penumbra of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments"76 should be applied to forbid the wiretapping and the 
use in evidence of its fruits. But it was the eloquent, oft-quoted dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Brandeis that came closest to the views announced 
in Griswold in 1965. Arguing for an interpretation of the Consti-
tution that would keep its prohibitions abreast of current develop-
ments, he pointed out that "subtler and more far-reaching means of 
invading privacy have become available to the Government. Dis-
covery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by 
means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain 
disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet."77 
Brandeis saw the fourth amendment as a basic charter of freedom 
from governmental intrusion into private affairs. In the most famous 
passage of his dissent he said: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness .... They conferred, as 
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the 
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the 
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal proceeding, 
of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a viola-
tion of the Fifth.78 
Closely related to the wiretapping question involved in Olm-
stead is the right of privacy claim raised-and rejected-in the eaves-
dropping cases. In electronic eavesdropping, which has been 
described as "the ultimate invasion of privacy,"70 the fears of 
Brandeis have come alive. Any telephone can be quickly transformed 
76. Id. at 469. 
77. Id. at 473. See Brandeis &: Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV, L. REv. 193, 
195 (1890): "[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction 
that 'what js whispered in the closet' shall be proclaimed from the house-tops." 
78. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928). 
79. WILLIAMS, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: A Defense Counsel's 
View, 44 MINN. L. REv. 855, 866 (1960). See also DASH, KNOWLTON &: SCHWARTZ, THE 
EAVESDROPPERS 339.79 (1959); PACKARD, THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964); Symposium, Science 
and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1325 (1965); King, Electronic Surveillance and Consti-
tutional Rights: Some Developments and Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 240 
(1965); Michael, Speculations on the Relation of the Computer to Individual Freedom 
and the Right to Privacy, id. at 270. 
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into a microphone which transmits every sound in the room, and 
so-called parabolic microphones can eavesdrop on a conversation in 
a room across a hundred-foot-wide street, but there is no constitu-
tional protection against such intrusions.80 Even the wiretapping 
prohibitions in section 605 of the Federal Communications Act offer 
at best limited protection to conversations thought private by their 
direct participants. 81 
C. Other Potential Right-of-Privacy Claims 
The privacy argument has been urged and rejected in other 
cases, but always in relation to some claimed violation of the fourth 
or fifth amendments-never in connection with Mr. Justice Douglas' 
"penumbra" concept or Mr: Justice Goldberg's ninth amendment 
argument. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak,82 for example, 
the Court rejected a claim that radio programs on buses and street-
cars of a private company regulated by the District of Columbia 
invaded the privacy rights of passengers in violation of the due 
process clause of the fifth amendment. Mr. Justice Douglas was the 
only dissenter: 
The case comes down to the meaning of "liberty" as used in 
the Fifth Amendment. Liberty in the constitutional sense must 
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; 
it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of 
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of 
all freedom. 
If we remembered this lesson taught by the First Amend-
ment [the "sanctity of thought and belief" as "important aspects 
of the constitutional right to be let alone"], I do not believe 
we would construe "liberty" within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment as narrowly as the Court does.83 
In Frank v. Maryland84 the Court specifically acknowledged that 
the fourth and fifth amendments protect "the right to be secure from 
intrusion into personal privacy"85 and the "intimately related" right 
of self-protection-"the right to resist unauthorized entry which has 
as its design the securing of information which may be used to 
effect a further deprivation of life or liberty or property."86 But in 
80. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 
U.S. 129 (1942); cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); Lanza v. New York, 
370 U .s. 139 (1962). 
81. See generally Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis and a Legis-
lative Proposal, 52 CoLUM. L. REV. 165 (1952). 
82. 343 U.S. 451 (1952). 
83. Id. at 467-68. See also DOUGLAS, Tm: RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 87 (1958). 
84. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). 
85. Id. at 365. 
86. Ibid. 
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that case the action complained against was the demand made by 
a municipal health inspector without a search warrant to enter 
private premises in search of health hazards. Since no evidence for 
criminal prosecutions was sought to be seized, a majority of the 
Court denied the existence of any right of privacy sufficient to pre-
clude the search. The four dissenters, in an opinion by Mr. Justice 
Douglas, thought that the decision "greatly [ diluted] the right of 
privacy."87 
The privacy right has sometimes been discussed by individual 
members of the Court, usually in concurring or dissenting opinions, 
in connection with rights said to be protectep. by constitutional pro-
visions other than the fourth and fifth amendments. Thus, it has 
been suggested that the first amendment-related freedoms of speech, 
conscience, and association are aspects of the right to privacy, because 
"the right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an 
area into which the Government may not enter."88 Accordingly, 
it has also been suggested that "the interest in privacy as it relates 
to freedom of speech and assembly"89 is sufficiently important to 
carry with it a presumption of noninterference by state investigatory 
authorities except upon a "showing by the State sufficient to counter-
balance"90 the privacy right. Similar considerations may also be 
relevant for some Justices in other first amendment areas, including 
problems arising out of loyalty oaths,91 admission to the bar,92 
membership disclosure requirements,93 and freedom of travel.94 
But other members of the Court have continued to think of these 
matters solely in terms of the first amendment prohibitions, without 
considering the potential privacy aspects of the asserted rights. Since 
the Court has often been closely divided on these cases, with decisions 
wavering from one side to the other of the thin line that divides 
governmental power from individual liberties, it is interesting to 
speculate whether elevation of the privacy right to majority status 
in Griswold may also foretell a new way of looking at those aspects 
87. Id. at 371 . 
. 88. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570 (1963) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). See also id. at 565, 569. 
89. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 107 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
90. Ibid. 
91. E.g., Baggett v • .Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
92. E.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. 
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). · . 
93. E.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 861 U.S. 516 
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
94. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 857 
U.S. 116 (1958). 
December 1965] Emanations and Intimations 277 
of the right to be let alone that depend on the first amendment for 
their protection against governmental intrusion. 
When the Court has recognized a right of privacy in some con-
text other than the traditional fourth and fifth amendment protec-
tion against the taking of property to be used as evidence to aid in 
criminal prosecutions (and apart from the first amendment areas 
mentioned above), the privacy concept has sometimes been invoked 
as a mak.eweight to help in downgrading claimed invasions of other 
constitutional rights. Thus, in Breard v. Alexandria,95 the Court 
upheld an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation by out-of-state 
solicitors for magazine subscriptions. The balance was said to be 
"between some householder's desire for privacy and the publisher's 
right to distribute publications in the precise way that those soliciting 
for him think brings the best results."96 The four dissenters could 
scarcely see this as a privacy right at all, but as an excuse to down-
grade what some saw as first amendment rights97 and others as the 
interest in the free flow of interstate commerce.98 
Another item in this pre-Griswold catalogue of privacy rights is 
Skinner v. Oklahoma,99 in .which the Court offered protection 
against involuntary sterilization pursuant to a statutory authorization 
that was discriminatory in its application. That judgment, however, 
rested solely on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to protect the dignity and personality of the individual. 
The short of it is that the right of privacy has been much dis-
cussed in the Supreme Court opinions, particularly in recent years, 
but substantively nothing much came of that discussion until Gris-
wold. Except for the fourth amendment holdings, the talk about 
privacy rights was not supported with judgments in vindication of 
privacy rights until Griswold. Even in the fourth amendment cases, 
despite an increasing tendency to talk about that amendment's pro-
tection of privacy rights the holdings seem not to have gone beyond 
the 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States. However closely the 
fourth and fifth amendments may have been linked by the Boyd case, 
still the constitutional protection did no more than immunize from 
seizure, real or constructive. The continuing refusal to exclude evi-
dence gained through wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping, and 
the refusal to apply the fourth amendment to "civil" searches, neces-
sarily demonstrate that the right of privacy, unlike other individual 
95. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). 
96. Id. at 644. 
97. Id. at 649 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). 
98. Id. at 645 (Vinson, C.J., and Douglas, J., dissenting). 
99. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
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liberty protections, has not significantly adapted itself to develop· 
ments after 1791. 
Griswold does not necessarily foretell evolution in the rather 
fixed doctrines ·of the fourth amendment. The fourth amendment 
right of privacy discussed above bears little resemblance to the 
right of marital privacy in Griswold. For purposes of comparison and 
contrast, it may be helpful to think of the fourth amendment right 
of privacy as a procedural protection-a limitation upon the means 
by which evidence can be obtained for the purpose of securing a 
criminal conviction. The right of marital privacy, on the other hand, 
is exclusively substantive; when applicable,100 it nullifies positive law 
enacted pursuant to otherwise valid legislative power. Accordingly, 
there is no necessary generative force in Griswold in relation to the 
traditional fourth amendID.ent area. 
While it is thus perfectly possible for the two kinds of privacy 
to stand entirely apart, never quite touching, it seems more likely 
that the new privacy will indeed have an impact on the old. How-
ever different from each other they may be, a mutually developing 
relationship might be worked out. For example, even if it is · con· 
ceded that wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are not viola-
tions of the fourth or fifth amendments, the Douglas "penumbra" 
argument could be advanced to establish that "emanations" from 
the Bill of Rights forbid wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. 
(If this argument seems a bit thin to overcome long-established doc-
trine-as well it might-the ninth amendment argument may offer 
greater promise.) If there is a right to marital privacy in the home, 
why should there not be as well a right of privacy in the home or 
place of business against the unwelcome intrusion of uninvited par-
ticipants in conversations intended to be private? If the right of 
. privacy is not to be limited narrowly to the facts of Griswold, but is 
100. In describing the new right as that of marital privacy, emphasis should appar-
ently be on the word "marital." The concurring opinions by Justices Goldberg and 
White state explicitly that the holding "in no way interferes with a State's proper 
regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct," 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J,, con• 
curring); id. at 505-07 (White, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Harlan had made the same 
point in his dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961), and he adopted those 
views in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring). These expressions of will-
ingness to allow the states to continue to forbid adultery, homosexuality, and other 
disfavored sexual acts make the result in Griswold more acceptable to a society that 
has always voiced its public disapproval of sexual nonconformity; they do not, how• 
ever, make easier the task of the disinterested student of the law who is required to 
seek distinctions between the right of marital privacy and the nonright of unwedded 
privacy. Perhaps better than anything else this emphasizes that Griswold is not a 
fourth amendment case. The fourth amendment, after all, protects the privacy of the 
home as to illicit activity to the same extent that it protects against disclosure of 
innocent activities. 
December 1965] Emanations and Intimations 279 
meant to foretell broad protection for the dignity of man and the 
inviolability of his rights of personality, then should not its appli-
cabi~ity be considered in connection with legislative investigations, 
loyalty oaths, freedom to travel, religious freedom, and other first 
amendment-related rights? 
Far more important than the result on the narrowly special facts 
of Griswold is the question whether the principle there announced 
can have these important collateral consequences. It is certainly more 
than a bare possibility. 
IV. GOVERNMENT AND THE DISSEMINATION 
OF BIRTH CONTROL INFORMATION 
If the Constitution of the United States is to remain relevant to 
government in the latter half of the twentieth century, it must 
provide viable answers to the difficult questions of governmental 
structure and power. It has already been observed that the Griswold 
case has significance in relation to modern concepts of federalism. 
Another twentieth century problem is the growing tension between 
the assumed necessity for a strong state largely devoted to the achieve-
ment of social welfare ends and the equally pressing need to preserve 
the individual from the gathering forces of big government. Intima-
tions from Griswold contribute to that continuing dialogue. 
Before the Supreme Court decision in Griswold, the underlying 
social issue reflected in that case appeared to be a fairly narrow one. 
In a 1956 symposium, no one challenged this statement of the then-
relevant question: "Should the state prohibit or otherwise regulate 
the sale or use of contraceptives?"101 The new question pertinent to 
the immediate discussion is whether any government, state or federal, 
may disseminate birth control information through public health 
clinics and social welfare programs in the United States and through 
international aid programs abroad. 
At first impression the problem might not seem very difficult. 
In states where the giving of birth control information has not 
raised serious political or religious problems, such information has 
been made available. Moreover, the once-substantial opposition to 
the traffic in birth control devices as articles of commerce has been 
101. Symposium-Morals, Medicine, and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. II57, II58 (1956). 
Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., almost alone among the contributors to that symposium, 
noted another question, which he relegated to footnote attention: "A few states now 
have public birth control clinics. There is perhaps a small issue here as to whether 
a Catholic taxpayer has any basis for protesting this use of public funds. There is a 
difference between permitting contraception and sponsoring it." Kalven, A Special Cor-
ner of Civil Liberties-A Legal View, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1223, 1224-25 n.l (1956). 
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gradually eroded.102 If the states' power to prohibit the use of con-
traceptives is denied, governmental participation in the information-
dispensing process might seem assured. However, a new argument 
against any governmental role at all in this process has been raised, 
principally by spokesmen for the Roman Catholic Church. 
It is well known that the Catholic Church has long objected 
on moral grounds to the use of contraceptives. Indeed, in days past 
Catholic authorities in Massachusetts supported "Vote God's Way" 
campaigns against repeal of the state's laws prohibiting the dissemina-
tion of birth control information. Seeking statutory prohibition 
even as to non-members of that church was not illogical as a means of 
attaining religious objectives. So long as anti-use and anti-dis-
semination statutes could be kept alive, state-supported family plan-
ning programs could scarcely be proposed, and even private clinics 
would operate at the peril of police action. 
Gradually, however, Catholic support of these statutes weakened, 
although without any change in the moral prohibition applicable to 
members of that church. Indeed, the Catholic Conference on Civil 
Liberties presented an amicus curiae brief in Griswold supporting 
invalidation, on privacy grounds, of the Connecticut law. 
When the Supreme Court based its invalidation of the Connecti-
cut law squarely on the privacy ground, few Catholic leaders ex-
pressed public disapproval, and some Catholics identified with the 
liberal tradition announced cautious approval.103 Indeed, in a state-
ment that had been approved before release by the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference, William Ball, general counsel for the Pennsyl-
vania Catholic Conference, had some kind words for the decision.104 
But the focus had by this time shifted. Mr. Ball voiced Conference 
approval of Griswold in the context of his testimony in opposition to 
a Senate bi11105 which proposed authorization for the United States 
"more effectively to deal with rapid population growth throughout 
the world and the problems arising from or connected with such 
growth .... " Catholic critics of the bill feared that it was the first 
step, not only to promote study of population control, which they 
102. See Kalven, supra note 101, at 1224-29; Ploscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-
Moral Problems: A Legal View, 31 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 1238, 1240-41 (1956): Comment, 
History and Future of the Legal Battle Over Birth Control, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 275 
(1964). . 
103. See Ball, The Court and Birth Control, 82 COMMONWEAL 490 (1965). Sec also 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1965, p. 42, col. I; id., Aug. 29, 1965, p. E5, col. I. 
104. Statement prepared for presentation August 24, 1965, before the Subcommittee 
on Foreign Aid Expenditures of tJ?.e Senate Committee on Government Operations 
(mimco.). 
105. S. 1676 (89th Cong., 1st Sess.). 
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did not oppose, but al_so to facilitate governmental efforts to dis-
seminate birth control information at home and abroad. 
It is somewhat ironic that the arguments against the bill were 
based on the new-found friend, the right of privacy. The argument 
went something like this: For better or for worse, this is the age of 
the welfare state. The welfare state and its companion, big govern-
ment, raise problems for the individual, particularly as he seeks to 
preserve his identity from being submerged into the undifferentiated 
mass. Grounding of the Griswold decision on the right of privacy is 
said to illustrate again the Supreme Court's concern with individual 
liberty, already manifested in other areas. It is suggested that the 
School Prayer Case,106 for example, manifested another facet of the 
same effort by the Court to protect against governmental intrusion 
into areas that should remain private. In forbidding state sponsor-
ship of prayers in public schools, the Supreme Court is said to have 
"found coercion to be inherent in the child-state relationship, even 
though the project was broadly considered good for children and 
for society, and even though the child could be exempt by claim-
ing his privilege of non-participation."107 
We have been reminded of related dangers that lurk in social 
welfare programs. Professor Charles Reich has pointed out the 
dangers to privacy in the administration of welfare programs, and 
he cautions that some welfare regulations attempt "to impose a 
standard of moral behavior on beneficiaries."108 Building upon all 
these concerns, Mr. Ball fears that the use of state power to dis-
seminate birth control information may be regarded as coercive by 
the recipients. He suggests: 
The reach of the inquisitorial power of the state in the case-
worker-client relationship, moreover, raises most serious ques-
tions precisely in the area of privacy now constitutionally zoned 
by the Supreme Court. Does it extend to such matters as fre-
quency of sexual intercourse, ethical outlook, savings habits, 
drinking habits? What may be made a matter of record, and 
what guarantees of confidentiality are legally mandated?" How far 
(apart from birth control) may the "planning" in family plan-
ning be carried?109 
Even well-intentioned welfare workers, he fears, may tend to develop 
106. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
107. Statement, supra note 104, at 9. 
108. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare-The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 
YALE L.J. 1245, 1247 (1965). See also Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social 
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963). 
109. Ball, supra note 103, at 493. 
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a "highly managerial paternalism toward the poor,"110 based upon 
"unspoken puritanical assumptions respecting 'undesirables.' "111 
These suggestions seem alarming at first, but they may be only 
alarmist. It is doubtless true that there are possibilities for abuse, 
even serious abuse, in any governmental program. Even as members 
of disadvantaged groups are especially vulnerable to expressions of 
governmental hostility, they are also especially likely to misinterpret 
poorly administered attempts at governmental solicitude. But that 
is not to say that programs with humanitarian objectives should not 
be attempted because of the danger of overreaching. The risk in-
volved should instead emphasize the need for careful surveillance of 
the administration of useful programs that are susceptible to abuse 
through excess of good will. Difficulties of administration should not 
be elevated to constitutional status. 
Nowhere is the problem more acute than in the area of birth 
control information. If the dangers are substantial, the needs are 
equally so. It is perfectly clear that birth control information and 
anti-contraceptive devices are readily available to the well-to-do and 
middle classes of American society, where they are widely used. To 
deny similar information and equal availability to the poor and ill-
informed seems likely to add yet another discrimination to those al-
ready suffered by the poor. Disadvantage because of poverty is already 
widespread, and must not be extended. To do so under a claim of 
privacy would make hollow the victory for individual liberty in 
Griswold. 
110. Ibid. 
111. Ibid. 
